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Abstract
This paper estimates the incumbency eﬀects in the legislative elections of 45 states in
the USduring the period 1968-89. I improve upon the existingmeasures of incumbency
byusing a quasi-experimental research design that isolates the eﬀect due to incumbency
from other contemporaneous factors such as candidate quality. I find that incumbency
bestows a significant advantage on incumbents compared with their challengers. The
incumbent candidates are about 30 percentage points more likely to win the next
election and win 5.3 percentage point more votes than the challengers. However, the
advantage is not as large as estimated from the previous methods.
∗This research has benefitted immensely from discussions with Amihai Glazer, Bernard Grofman, David
Brownstone, Priya Ranjan, Kamal Sadiq and Christopher Carpenter. I would thank Keith Finlay and Albert
Sumell for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I would also thank the participants at the
Plurality and Multi-round Electoral Systems Conference and the Democracy and its Development Conference
sponsored by the Center for the Study of Democracy at the UC, Irvine. All errors are mine.
1 Introduction
Much research points to a significant advantage of incumbency in Congressional and
state elections in the United States (Alford and Hibbing (1981); Gelman and King (1990);
Breaux (1990); Holbrook and Tidmarch (1991); Cox andMorgenstern (1993,1995)). Though
investigation of the reasons for the incumbency advantage has received much attention,
little care has been taken to address the first order concerns of estimating the causal eﬀect
of incumbency.1 This is especially true of methods used for estimating the incumbency
eﬀects at the state level.2
The main issue with the estimation of the incumbency eﬀects, as with the estimation of
treatment eﬀects from any observational data, that it is not possible for the researcher to
observe candidates both as incumbents and, in the counterfactual state, as non-incumbents
at the same time. As a result, we cannot observe how incumbents would have done had
theynot become incumbents. The drawback ofmany existingmethods is that they estimate
the incumbency eﬀects based on diﬀerential outcomes of incumbents and non-incumbents
without ensuring if non-incumbents could be assumed to represent a good counterfactual
case for incumbents. This would not be a problem if the assignment of incumbency status
was determined randomly or exogenously. However, in practice, this assumption would
most likely not be met, and hence, the estimated incumbency eﬀect will suﬀer from a
selection bias.
The selection bias arises because incumbents and non-incumbents are not likely to be
comparable to start with. More specifically, it is highly plausible that incumbents may win
in the first place due to their charismatic personality or their better type, and may continue
1Many factors are said to contribute to the incumbency advantage: franking privileges (Mayhew (1974)),
increased bureaucratic resources available to incumbents (Fiorina (1977)), personal staﬀ and trips back home
(Holbrook and Tidmarch (1991)), operating budgets available to the legislators (Cox and Morgenstern (1993))
and salary (Carey, Neimi and Powell (2000)).
2Many methods based primarily on Gelman and King (1990) identify the incumbency eﬀects by comparing
the vote share in the seats in which incumbents run for a reelection against the vote share in open seats control-
ling for partisan swings. The idea is that if incumbency has any advantage, the seats in which incumbents run
for a reelection should observe greater winning vote share on average than the open seats. The other methods
used are sophomore surge, the average vote gain enjoyed by freshman candidates running as incumbents for
the first time, and the retirement slump, the average falloﬀ in the party’s vote when the incumbent retires
(Cover and Mayhew (1977)).
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to win due to persistence of these qualities. Also, incumbents may be helped by the quality
of challengers they face. It could be that incumbents due to their apparent advantage,
either due to higher quality or incumbency, may deter other high quality challengers from
running against them, and hence, face weaker challengers. As a result, the so-called
incumbency advantage could, at least in part, be an artifact of the selection bias rather than
the causal eﬀect of incumbency.
Using district-level election returns of the lower chamber of 45 state legislatures in the
United States during 1968-89, this paper estimates the casual eﬀect of incumbency status
of a candidate on his or her outcome in the next election3 I use an innovative empirical
methodology, regression discontinuity design (RDD), that is quasi-experimental in nature
and allows us to draw causal inferences from real-world observational data. This research
design solves the selection problem and achieves an approximate random assignment of
incumbency status by comparingwinners and losers in closely contested elections. The idea
is that the losers of such elections (bare losers) are, on average, similar to the winners (bare
winners), anddiﬀer only in their incumbency statusproviding agood counterfactual tohow
incumbents might have fared without incumbency. However, the outcome of any election
also has some random chance component such as weather conditions on the election day
or whether postal ballots arrive on time. These random factors are not likely to diﬀer
systematically between winners and losers, which coupled with their comparability in
close contests implies that the assignment of incumbency status is approximately random.
So, any diﬀerence in the average outcomes of bare winners and bare losers in the next
election will identify what is essentially the causal eﬀect of incumbency.
Thistlethwaite and Cambell (1960) first used a regression discontinuity design to study
the eﬀect of student scholarships on career aspirations, given that students are awarded
scholarships only if their test score exceeds a certain threshold. Hahn et al (2001) for-
malize the conditions required for identification and estimation of treatment eﬀects using
regression discontinuity design. Lee et al (2004) use regression discontinuity technique
3This causal eﬀect is defined as the eﬀect solely due to the perquisites of oﬃce such as franking privileges,
bureaucratic resources and staﬀ, operating budgets and so on, after isolating the eﬀect due to candidate quality.
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on roll-call data for the United States House of Representatives during 1946-1995 to find
evidence of a complete divergence between the announced policies of candidates contrary
to the predictions of the median voter theorem. Imbens and Lemieux (2007) provides a
comprehensive overview of the regression discontinuity technique. (Lee (2008) uses re-
gression discontinuity design to estimate the partisan incumbency eﬀects in elections to the
US House of Representatives. He finds that the incumbent party is about 40-45 percentage
points more likely to win an election than the non-incumbent party. However, he focuses
on the estimation of partisan incumbency eﬀects rather than candidate-level incumbency
eﬀects that are more prevalent in the existing literature.
The primary results of this paper can be summarized as follows. First, an incumbent
candidate is about 30 percentage points more likely to win and receives 5.3 percentage
point more votes in the next election than a challenger. Second, the incumbency advantage
using regression discontinuity technique is not as large as estimated by existing techniques
implying a significant selection bias present in the latter techniques. Third, the finding of
a significant incumbency advantage also explains why fewer challengers run again after
losing once, the so-called deterrent eﬀect of incumbency. The diﬀerence in the probability
of rerunning between bare winners and bare losers is about 53 percentage points. Fourth,
the incumbency advantage is lower in elections at the state level than at the federal level.
The brief outline of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 lays out the
empirical methodology in detail. The complexities of data issues are discussed in section
3. Section 4 estimates the incumbency eﬀects and checks for the validity of the regression
discontinuity as a quasi-experimental research design. Section 5 performs the robustness
checks of the estimated incumbency eﬀects. Section 6 compares the regressiondiscontinuity
estimates of incumbency with some existing methods. Section 7 concludes the paper.
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2 Methodology
As discussed in Hahn et al (2001), regression discontinuity design is a quasi-experimental
research method that achieves randomized assignment of treatment status using non-
random real-world data. The regression discontinuity design exploits a known disconti-
nuity in the treatment assignment mechanism, which is a deterministic function of some
underlying variable called the forcing variable. Individuals whose score is greater than a
predetermined threshold of the forcing variable get the treatment. The treatment eﬀects
are identified locally at the point of the discontinuity where the individuals who get the
treatment are likely to be comparable to individuals who do not get the treatment.
Similarly in case of elections, the assignment of incumbency status of a candidate is a
deterministic function of themargin of victory. Candidates for whom themargin of victory
is positive (winners) become incumbents and those forwhom it is negative (losers) are non-
incumbents. The assignment of incumbency status is discontinuous at a predetermined
threshold of zero margin of victory. This particular feature of elections allows us to use the
regression discontinuity design for the estimation of the causal eﬀect of incumbency, which
is identified by comparing the next-period electoral outcomes of candidates who are just
above the threshold margin of victory with candidates who are just below it.
More formally, consider the following regression model:
Vi,t+1 = Ni + γt+1 + β ∗ Ii,t+1 + εi,t+1 (1)
where Vi,t+1 is the vote share of candidate i in election t+1, Ni is the state specific normal
vote for candidate i’s party, γt+1 represent the national partisan swings, Ii,t+1 is an indicator
variable for incumbency status of candidate i in election t+1 such that,
Ii,t+1 = 1 i f movi,t > 0 (2)
= 0 i f movi,t < 0
εi,t+1 is the stochastic error term, andmovi,t is themargin of victory of candidate i in election
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t. Thoughmovi,t is continuously defined, incumbency status is discontinuous at movi,t = 0.
In the ideal case when the assignment of incumbency status is random (E[εi,t+1|Ii,t+1),
β is the true incumbency eﬀect as shown in equation (3) and equals the diﬀerence in the
average vote shares of winners and losers in t+1:
E[Vi,t+1 | Ii,t+1 = 1] − E[Vi,t+1 | Ii,t+1 = 0] = β (3)
However, the assignment of incumbency status is likely non-random as there are intrinsic
diﬀerences in candidate characteristics (Xi,t). If all candidate characteristics are observable,
they can be controlled for in the regressionmodel assuming the latter is correctly specified.
However, there is some unobserved heterogeneity among the candidates. For instance, it
is diﬃcult to measure how charismatic a candidate is. As a result, the error term (εi,t+1) in
(1) is δ ∗ Xi,t + μi,t+1 and the model in (1) will suﬀer from a selection bias arising due to the
omitted variables or the omitted variable bias. Since these unobservable characteristics are
likely to varywith themargin of victory, incumbency status is correlatedwith the stochastic
error term (E[εi,t+1|Ii,t+1]  0). In this case, the overall eﬀect also includes the eﬀect due to
systematic diﬀerences in candidate characteristics in addition to the incumbency eﬀect:
E[Vi,t+1 | Ii,t+1 = 1] − E[Vi,t+1 | Ii,t+1 = 0] = β + BIASi,t+1 (4)
where
BIASi,t+1 = δ ∗ {E[Xi,t | Ii,t+1 = 1] − E[Xi,t | Ii,t+1 = 0]} (5)
+
{
E[μi,t+1 | Ii,t+1 = 1] − E[μi,t+1 | Ii,t+1 = 0]}
Equations (4) and (5) can alternatively be written as follows:
E[Vi,t+1 | movi,t > 0] − E[Vi,t+1 | movi,t < 0] = β + BIASi,t+1 (6)
BIASi,t+1 = δ ∗ {E[Xi,t | movi,t > 0] − E[Xi,t | movi,t < 0]} (7)
+
{
E[μi,t+1 | movi,t > 0] − E[μi,t+1 | movi,t < 0]}
6
However, the regression discontinuity design does not require any characteristics to be
included in the regression model, and hence, bypass any concerns of correct specification
of model. The systematic diﬀerences between incumbents and non-incumbents can be fac-
tored out by comparing the two sets of candidates within an arbitrary close neighborhood
of the discontinuity:
E[Vi,t+1 | 0 < movi,t ≤ ψ] − E[Vi,t+1 | −ψ ≤ movi,t < 0] = β + BIAS∗i,t+1 (8)
where
BIAS∗i,t+1 = δ ∗
{
E[Xi,t | 0 < movi,t ≤ ψ] − E[Xi,t | −ψ ≤ movi,t < 0]} (9)
+
{
E[μi,t+1 | 0 < movi,t ≤ ψ] − E[μi,t+1 | −ψ ≤ movi,t < 0]}
andψ represents the closeness of the elections. In the limit or aswe examine closer elections,
δ ∗
{
lim
ψ→0+ E[Xi,t | 0 < movi,t ≤ ψ] − limψ→0− E[Xi,t | −ψ ≤ movi,t < 0]
}
(10)
+
{
lim
ψ→0+ E[μi,t+1 | 0 < movi,t ≤ ψ] − limψ→0− E[μi,t+1 | −ψ ≤ movi,t < 0]
}
= 0
lim
ψ→0+ E[Vi,t+1|0 < movi,t ≤ ψ] − limψ→0− E[Vi,t+1| − ψ ≤ movi,t < 0] = β (11)
BIAS∗i,t+1 goes to zero and β gives us the true incumbency eﬀect, which is the size of
discontinuity at the threshold.
Though RDD is a simple research design, its validity depends on the condition given
by equation (10), which implies that candidates just above the threshold are similar to can-
didates just below it. This, in turn, implies that the distribution of candidate characteristics
is continuous. The continuity of observable characteristics can be readily checked with
the data and any diﬀerences at the threshold should show up as indicators of a failure
to achieve a random assignment of incumbency status. The only assumption made here
is that the unobservable characteristics are continuous functions of the margin of victory,
which is a much weaker restriction on the stochastic error term and implies g(μ|mov), the
conditional density function of μ, is continuous.
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3 Data Description
This paper uses revised district-level data on state legislative elections available from the
Inter-University Consortium of Political Science Research (ICPSR). This dataset covers
the state legislative elections held between 1968 and 1989, and provides the following
information: candidates’ names, vote shares, party aﬃliation and incumbency status.
There is also information on the number of peoplewho voted and the number of candidates
contesting for a seat. The incumbency eﬀects are estimated for the general election results of
the lower chamber (the State House or Assembly as it is called in some states) of 45 states.
The analysis includes all the single member and multi-member post district elections.4
There is no clear way to compute the margin of victory in other types of multi-member
districts, so I omitted them from the analysis.
The state elections suﬀer from frequent redistricting. The problems associated with the
comparison of the electionpreceding the change of the district lineswith theone succeeding
it are quite well known, and hence, such elections are excluded from the analysis. Also,
I exclude the seats in which a candidate contested unopposed as the actual vote share
of the candidate is not observed in such elections. After stacking up the elections in the
pairs of consecutive elections at t and t + 1 and other exclusions mentioned above, the
final count of total candidate-level observations is 40,120. The existing literature uses
either vote-denominated measures of incumbency (Erikson (1972), Mayhew (1974), Cover
and Mayhew (1977), Alford and Hibbing (1981)) or outcome-denominated measures of
incumbency (Jacobson (1985, 1987)). I estimate the incumbency eﬀect using bothmeasures.
The RDD requires that bare winners and bare losers be comparable on all character-
istics other than their incumbency status. A check based on all possible characteristics
is, however, constrained by the available data. But the original data file from the ICPSR
can be used to derive somemeasures of candidate quality which are standard in the litera-
4Many districts at the state level elect more than one legislator. These districts are divided in to multi-
member post seats and multi-member free-for-all districts. Since multi-member post seats districts elect a
single member for each post, they are treated as single member districts. However, Multi-member free-for-all
districts elect more than one candidate for one seat and, hence, have multiple winners.
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ture. I compare incumbent and non-incumbent candidates on the following characteristics:
electoral experience at t defined as the number of times a candidate has been nominated
before election in t; political experience at t defined as the number of times a candidate has
won an election before election in t; vote share in t − 1; the indicator variable representing
victory in t − 1; proportion of candidates belonging to the Democratic Party; proportion
of candidates belonging to the Republican Party; number of people who voted in election
t and number of candidates running for election in t. The data on characteristics such
as campaign spending that may be important are not available. Due to this reason, I am
unable to check for the diﬀerences in campaign spending in the close elections. However,
I compare candidates on various measures of candidate quality (mentioned above) which
is a major determinant of the campaign money collected by a candidate (Jacobson (1978,
1980), Lott (1986, 1991), Levitt (1994).
Another issue is that many candidates, particularly losers, do not rerun, and hence,
are more likely to be unobserved in the next election. Ideally, the solution to this problem
would require one tomodel the rerunning decisions of the candidates independently of the
prospects of winning. Since the data to achieve this task is not available and the decision
to run is heavily determined by the chances of winning, I condition my estimates of the
incumbency eﬀect on candidateswho run in the next election. This solution, however, does
not come without any price. The estimates based on this conditional sample may suﬀer
from a sample selection bias. For example, it is highly plausible that the losers who rerun
are stronger than the losers who do not rerun, which would cause my estimates of the
incumbency eﬀect to be biased downwards. The appendix to the paper shows that there
is no such bias present in my estimates as the losers who rerun and who do not rerun are
comparable on all candidate characteristics in the data.
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4 Estimation of the Incumbency Eﬀects
In Figure 1, Panel(a) plots the probability of winning in t + 1 against the margin of victory
in t (movt) conditional on candidates who rerun. The scatter plot (local averages) depicts
the raw probability of winning computed by averaging an indicator variable for victory
in t+1 over an interval of 0.5% of margin of victory, which is the proportion of winners in
each interval. The solid curve exhibits the predicted probability of winning using a logistic
regression of the indicator variable for victory in t + 1 on an indicator variable for victory
in t, a fourth-order polynomial of margin of victory in t, the interaction of the polynomial
terms with the indicator variable for victory in t, and the state-year fixed eﬀects.5 The
incumbency eﬀect is the size of the discontinuity, which is the diﬀerence in the predicted
probabilities of the winners and the losers evaluated at the threshold margin of victory of
zero.
〈Figure 1 about here〉
There is a clear discontinuous jump in the probability of winning at the threshold. The
size of the discontinuity measuring the incumbency advantage is about 0.3, which implies
that bare winners are about 30 percentage points more likely to win the next election than
bare losers. Also, the fourth-order polynomial fit used here fits the raw data well, and no
discontinuity is evident in the predicted probabilities except at the threshold. Panel(b),
which plots the vote share in t+1 against the margin of victory in t using local averages and
the polynomial fit, also confirms a significant advantage to incumbency. The incumbency
advantage is about 5.3 percentage points of votes implying that bare winners win about
5.3 percentage points more votes in the next election than bare losers.
This is a significant advantage and may provide incumbents enormous security of
tenure, which has given impetus to debate about enactment of term limits in state legisla-
tures.6 However, the incumbency advantage found here at the state level is smaller than
5This specification of left hand side variables is referred to as the polynomial fit and will be used for the
following regressions unless stated otherwise.
6Gilmour and Rothstein (1996) attribute decreased turnover in the Congress solely to the incumbency
advantage. Furthermore, the control of the oﬃce by incumbents that is implied by the incumbency advantage
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found at the federal level. Lee (2008) estimates the incumbency eﬀect to be 45 percentage
points of probability of winning and 8 percentage points of votes for the House of Repre-
sentatives at the federal level. However, we should note that Lee estimates the incumbency
eﬀects for the party rather than for a candidate. So the two sets of estimates are not directly
comparable.
〈Figure 2 about here〉
The incumbencyadvantage alsohas a strongdeterrent eﬀect as itmight force challengers
of similar quality not to run against the incumbent. Figure 2 plots the probability of
rerunning in t + 1 against the margin of victory in t using the local averages and the
polynomial fit. There is large diﬀerence between the probability of rerunning for winners
and losers. Bare winners are about 53 percentage points more likely to rerun than bare
losers. This reinforces the argument in this paper to account for the bias due to selection
eﬀects as the races featuring incumbent candidates may deter the high quality challengers
and attract only weak challengers artificially driving the incumbency advantage up.
However, the causal nature of the estimated incumbency eﬀects depends heavily on
the assumption that bare losers provide a good counterfactual to how bare winners would
have fared had they not won the election. This requires that bare losers and bare winners
are comparable in all predetermined characteristics except their incumbency status imply-
ing that all characteristics at t vary continuously with margin of victory in t. Figure 3 plots
the predetermined candidate characteristics against the margin of victory in t using local
averages and the polynomial fit. Many characteristics are increasing functions of margin
of victory. The vote share in t-1 of an incumbent who wins by a margin of victory of 20
percent is much higher than that of a non-incumbent who lost by 20 percent indicating
preexisting quality diﬀerences between candidates who are away from the threshold, and
hence, the non-comparability of such candidates. This underscores the need to account for
the selection bias that arises due to such diﬀerences. However, all the characteristics are
is at the heart of the debate about the term limits. Adams and Kenny (1986) argue that term limits could be
costly to the voters as the more experienced representatives vacate oﬃce. However, a politician who has held
the oﬃce long enough may become entrenched and transfer resources away from the voters to certain interest
groups.
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continuous function of margin of victory indicating there will be virtually no diﬀerences
in quality between candidates who barely won and who barely lost. This validates the
regression discontinuity design used in this paper and identifies the incumbency eﬀects es-
timated above as the causal eﬀects of incumbency isolating any quality diﬀerences between
candidates.
〈Figure 3 about here〉
Table 1 further highlights presence of selection bias due to systematic diﬀerences be-
tween incumbents and non-incumbents and the usefulness of the regression discontinuity
design in overcoming this bias. Columns (2)-(4) show the average diﬀerences in the prob-
ability of winning in t + 1, the vote share in t + 1 and all predetermined characteristics
for winners and losers in the full sample (All), when the margin of victory is within 25
percent, and when it is within 5 percent, respectively. In column (2), winners, on average,
have better outcomes in the next election compared to losers. Winners are 73 percentage
points more likely to win and have about 29 percentage points more votes in the next
election than losers. The magnitude of diﬀerences in the probability of winning and the
vote share in t+1 is large and implies a large advantage for winners. However, it will be
wrong to attribute the whole diﬀerence to incumbency because we also see that winners,
on average, win more votes in the previous election, are more likely to win the previous
election, have greater electoral and political experiences, are more likely to be a Democrat,
run from districts with less turnout, and face fewer candidates than losers. These diﬀer-
ences in candidate characteristics illustrate that a simple comparison of t and t+ 1 election
outcome (e.g. vote shares) as an estimate of the incumbency eﬀect is fraught with bias as
incumbents and non-incumbents are not comparable.
〈Table 1 about here〉
However, the diﬀerences particularly in various characteristics become smaller as we
compare closer elections. In the contests which are decided by a margin of victory of 5
percent or less, winners are 36 percentage points more likely to win and win about 8.7
percentage points more votes in the next election than losers. The diﬀerences in many
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predetermined characteristics are either statistically insignificant or become much smaller
(in the absolute value) strengthening the intuition behind the regression discontinuity
technique that in the limit at the threshold all diﬀerences would vanish.
In column (4), I examine the diﬀerences betweenwinners and losers in the limiting case
at the threshold. The diﬀerences are estimated using the polynomial fit and evaluated at
margin of victory of zero. The estimate of the incumbency eﬀect based on the diﬀerence in
the probability of winning is 0.30 percentage points and the diﬀerence in the vote share is
5.3 percentage points as was suggested in Figures 1 and 2 earlier. Though the diﬀerences in
the probability of winning and vote share in t+1 are statistically significant, the diﬀerences
in the predetermined candidate characteristics become insignificant.7
5 Robustness Checks
The regression discontinuity design also provides us with some robustness checks to fur-
ther ascertain its validity. I claim above that the regression discontinuity estimates of
incumbency are unbiased, and hence, bypass the need to include the candidate charac-
teristics in the regression model. We can check the robustness of this claim by including
all the characteristics as the covariates in the polynomial fit and see if the estimate of the
incumbency eﬀect changes significantly. Since the estimated incumbency eﬀects are unbi-
ased, the inclusion of any predetermined candidate characteristics as covariates should not
aﬀect the estimate of incumbency. Table 2 estimates the incumbency eﬀect based on diﬀer-
ent specifications. Column (1) re-presents the incumbency eﬀect estimated above using the
polynomial fit. In column (2), I include the electoral experience and political experience as
the covariates in the polynomial fit. The estimate of the incumbency eﬀect does not change
significantly from the estimate in the column (1). In column (3), the vote share and the
7Table A.1 in the appendix deals with the issue of selection bias that might arise due to conditioning my
estimates of incumbency on candidates who rerun. It is plausible that the losers who rerun could be stronger
than the ones who do not rerun. To check this, I compare rerunning losers and non-rerunning losers on all
candidate characteristics in the data around the threshold. As can be seen, rerunning losers and non-rerunning
losers are comparable on all the characteristics around the threshold as none of the diﬀerences are significant.
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indicator variable for a victory in the previous election are included as the covariates and
the incumbency eﬀect remains virtually unchanged. The same is the case in column (4)
where I include proportion of Democrats and proportion of Republicans as additional re-
gressors and column (5) where I include all predetermined candidate characteristics. This
shows that the estimated incumbency eﬀect is robust to diﬀerent specifications and reliably
estimates the causal eﬀect of incumbency.
〈Table 2 about here〉
〈Table 3 about here〉
As a last check of robustness, in column (6) I run the same regression with all the
characteristics includedbut theonlydiﬀerence is that thedependentvariable is the indicator
variable for victory in t− 1. This is to check if the outcome in t− 1 was equally likely as the
candidates are comparable. Also, the outcome in t − 1 is already determined, and hence,
should not be aﬀected by the characteristics in t. The probability diﬀerence in column
(6) is very small and statistically insignificant providing further support for my estimates
of incumbency. Table 3 does the robustness checks with the vote share as the dependent
variable. The results are the same and pass all robustness issues.
6 Comparisons of the RD estimates with previous meaures
There are three methodologies, namely the sophomore surge (SS), the retirement slump
(RS) and the Gelman-King method (GK) that have been widely used in the political science
literature to estimate the incumbency eﬀects. I estimate the incumbency eﬀects using these
three techniques and compare them with the estimated incumbency eﬀects in this paper
using the regression discontinuity design to gauge the extent of the selection bias in these
techniques. The sophomore surge is defined as the average vote gain enjoyed by freshman
candidates running as incumbents for the first time (Cover and Mayhew (1977)). The
intuition behind this measure is that if incumbency has any eﬀect on the fortunes of the
incumbents, it should show up in their vote share in the second election net of any party
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advantage (vote share of the incumbent in her first election). The retirement slump is the
average falloﬀ in the party’s vote when the incumbent retires. This is based on the logic
that if incumbency has any eﬀect, the new party nominee should not be expected to do as
well as the retired incumbent did.
〈Table 5 about here〉
In Table 5, the sophomore surge is about 1.8 percentage points of votes for a freshman
incumbent implying that an incumbent gains about 1.8 percentage points of votes in his
or her first reelection. The retirement slump is about 10.0 percentage points of votes
implying that the incumbent’s party on average loses 10.0 percentage point votes when
he or she retires. However, as argued by Gelman and King (1990), the sophomore surge
underestimates and the retirement slump overestimates the incumbency eﬀect. This is
indeed the case here as the sophomore surge is lower and the retirement slump is greater
than the regression discontinuity estimate of incumbency. Following Gelman and King
(1990), I run a regression of percentage of total vote won by the incumbent party in election
t+1 in district i on an incumbency dummy which takes a value of one if the incumbent
candidate runs of reelection and zero if it is an open seat, percentage of total vote won by
the incumbent party in election t in district i, and another dummywhich is equal to 1 if the
Democrats were the incumbent party, -1 if the Republicans were the incumbent party and
0 otherwise. The coeﬃcient on incumbency dummy provides the size of the incumbency
eﬀect, which is the vote diﬀerential in seats in which incumbents run and in the open seats.
The estimate of the incumbency eﬀect based on this method is about 8.7 percentage
points of the votes and is about 3.4 percentage points of the votes higher than the regression
discontinuity estimate of incumbency. This amounts to an overestimation of about 64
percent over the regression discontinuity estimate of the incumbency eﬀect. The Gelman-
King method does not ensure that candidates are comparable and hence also includes the
eﬀect due to other contemporaneous factors such as candidate quality. This estimate is
biased upwards because the seats in which incumbents run will have higher vote share just
because of higher quality of incumbents and lower quality of challengers they face when
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compared with the vote share in the open seats. However, this bias is not present in the
regression discontinuity estimates of incumbency as incumbents and non-incumbents are
similar in quality to each other.
7 Conclusions and Extensions
This paper estimates the causal eﬀect of incumbency using a quasi-experimental research
design, the regression discontinuity technique. The causal eﬀect is identified by comparing
winners and losers in closely contested elections. In such contests, incumbents and non-
incumbents are similar in quality, and hence, any diﬀerence in their electoral outcome in
the next election provides an unbiased estimate of the incumbency eﬀect. I find that there
is a large advantage to incumbency in the elections to the lower chamber at the state level.
An incumbent candidate is about 30 percentage points more likely to win an election and
wins 5.3 percentage points more votes in the next election compared with a challenger.
However, the incumbency eﬀect estimated in this paper is lower than the estimates from
other existing methods. These methods suﬀer from a significant selection bias as I show
that there are preexisting quality diﬀerences between incumbents and non-incumbents.
Incumbency also bestows a strong deterrent eﬀect as the diﬀerence between the probability
of rerunning for incumbents and non-incumbents of similar quality is about 53 percentage
points.
The results of this paper may be extended to study the following issues. First, it
will be interesting to examine how the incumbency eﬀects changes overtime and across
states. This would throw light on whether the incumbency eﬀect has increased recently
as some studies have found. Second, how can the variation in the incumbency eﬀects
across states be explained? At the state level, the incumbency advantage is found to
depend on a factor called professionalisation. Diﬀerent measures of professionalisation
are said to aﬀect the incumbency advantage. These include personal staﬀ and trips back
home, operating budgets available to the legislator and salary. Based on the regression
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discontinuity estimates of the incumbency eﬀects, the extension will weigh the relative
eﬀect of diﬀerent measures of professionalisation. Finally, one important implication of the
positive incumbency eﬀect is the longer tenure of the elected oﬃcials. It will be interesting
to examine if the longer tenure of the incumbents results in political shirking.
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Figure 1: The Incumbency Eﬀects: Conditional on Rerunning
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Figure 2: Probability of Rerunning in t+1
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Figure 3: Continuity of Candidate Characteristics
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Table 1: Estimation of the Incumbency Eﬀects and Continuity Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4). (5)
Differences between winners and losers 
All ? margin? ? 25 % ? margin? ? 5 % Polynomial fit 
Probability of winning in t+1 0.73* 
(0.006)
0.58* 
(0.01)
0.36* 
(0.02)
0.30* 
(0.04)
Vote share in t+1 29.1* 
(0.31)
16.3* 
(0.32)
8.7*
(0.51)
5.3*
(0.84)
Vote share in t-1 27.0* 
(0.67)
15.3* 
(0.76)
4.7*
(1.3)
0.7
(1.9)
Probability of winning in t-1 0.41* 
(0.01)
0.25* 
(0.01)
0.07* 
(0.02)
0.01
(0.03)
Electoral experience 0.82*
(0.03)
0.50* 
(0.03)
0.20* 
(0.05)
0.11
(0.07)
Political experience 0.89*
(0.03)
0.53* 
(0.03)
0.19* 
(0.05)
0.08
(0.07)
Proportion of Democrats 0.175* 
(0.01)
0.03* 
(0.01)
0.03
(0.03)
0.03
(0.04)
Proportion of Republicans -0.04*
(0.01)
0.04* 
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.02)
-0.03
(0.04)
Turnout -741
(460)
-141
(619)
-569
(1,223)
394
(1,253)
Number of candidates -0.11*
(0.01)
-0.04** 
(0.02)
0.00
(0.03)
0.01
(0.05)
Observations 16,468 9,015 2,260 16,468 
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Table 2: Incumbency Eﬀects Measured by the Probability Diﬀerence: Alternative Specifi-
cations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Difference in probability of winning in t+1 between winners and losers Probability 
difference in t-1
Dependent 
variable 
0.302* 
(0.040) 
0.306* 
(0.037) 
0.300* 
(0.037) 
0.298* 
 (0.036) 
0.300* 
(0.037) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
Electoral
experience 
No Yes No No Yes Yes
Political 
experience 
No Yes No No Yes Yes
Vote share in  
t-1 
No No Yes No Yes Yes
Win in t-1 No No Yes No Yes
Proportions of 
Democrats 
No No No Yes Yes Yes
Proportion of  
Republicans 
No No No Yes Yes Yes
Turnout No No No No Yes Yes
Number of 
candidates 
No No No No Yes Yes
State fixed 
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed 
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 16,468 16,449 16,449 16,449 16,449 16,449 
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Table 3: Incumbency Eﬀects Measured by the Vote Diﬀerences: Alternative Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent 
variable 
Difference in vote shares in t+1 between winners and losers Vote share 
difference in t-1
5.3* 
(0.84) 
5.4* 
(0.86) 
5.2* 
(0.88) 
5.1* 
(0.82) 
5.3* 
(0.90) 
-0.11 
(0.62) 
Electoral
experience 
No Yes No No Yes Yes
Political 
experience 
No Yes No No Yes Yes
Vote share in  
t-1
No No Yes No Yes
Win in t-1 No No Yes No Yes Yes
Proportions of 
Democrats 
No No No Yes Yes Yes
Proportion of  
Republicans 
No No No Yes Yes Yes
Turnout No No No No Yes Yes
Number of 
candidates 
No No No No Yes Yes
State fixed 
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed 
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 16,468 16,449 16,449 16,449 16,449 16,449 
Note: Standard errors are in the parentheses and are clustered at the state level. Each regression includes an 
indicator variable for victory in t, a fourth-order polynomial in margin of victory and their interactions, and 
state-year fixed effects as the right-hand-side variables in addition to the covariates being included in this 
table. One star (*), two stars (**) and three stars (***) indicate significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of 
significance, respectively. 
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Table 4: A Comparison of RDD with Previous Methodologies
METHODOLOGY SIZE OF THE 
INCUMBENCY EFFECT 
Sophomore surge 1.8 
Retirement slump 10.0 
Gelman-King 8.7 
RDD 5.3 
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Appendix A
Table A.1: Rerunning Losers vs Non-rerunning Losers
(1) (2) 
Difference= 
(Losing Rerunners – Losing Non-Rerunners) 
Electoral experience -0.08 
(0.06) 
Political experience -0.04 
(0.05) 
Vote share in t-1 0.7 
(1.7) 
Win in t-1 0.03 
(0.04) 
Proportions of 
Democrats 
0.05 
(0.05) 
Proportion of 
Republicans 
0.06 
(0.04) 
Turnout 111.0 
(1,281) 
Number of 
candidates 
0.04 
(0.35) 
Observations 22,302 
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